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Why the employees in an organization might want to form a union
Is a central question in labor relations. The recent growth of faculty
unionism in higher education provides academics the opportunity to address
that question in a spirit of self-inquiry. Garbarino, for example, identi-
fied 400 academic institutions with collective bargaining agreements.
First, however, a qualification is in order. Most professional associations
serving the faculty as unions do not describe themselves as unions, even
though they engage in collective bargaining. Previous research identifies
some characteristics of institutions with such faculty unions, e.g. public
control, favorable state legislation, and inclusion in a centrally adminis-
tered system of several related units. Nonetheless, a psychological
question remains: why do some academics within any given institution want
a union while others do not? This article assesses the validity of several
current explanations of individual interest in faculty unionism: (1) organi-
zational position, (2) personal background, (3) satisfaction with salary,
(4) participation in decision making, and (5) trust in decision making.
Since these explanations frequently overlap, this study analyzes their
intercorrelations to identify the relative importance of each.
Explanations of Individual Desire for Collective Bargaining
In summarizing an early questionnaire survey of faculty in higher
education across the nation, Ladd and Lipset emphasize two predictors of
un ion interest: political liberalism and the status of prestige of the
2individual's institution. Self-described liberalism and holding a position
at a lesser institution predict support for unions. According to a later survey of
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the University of Vermont by Nixon, low status individuals within the
institution hold more militant attitudes, where status includes organi-
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zational rank, salary, publication record, and age. Kemerer and Baldridge
provide the most extensive list of explanations of individual interest in
faculty unions based on their own questionnaire data from a national sample:
low salary, high teaching load, low education, low rank, youth, humanities
or social science discipline, liberal ideology, dissatisfaction with various
aspects of the institution including salary levels and low trust in the
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administration. These explanations, then, fall into three categories:
objective status or position with the institution, personal background of
the individual, and subjective attitudes or beliefs about the organization.
Additional explanations in this third, subjective category may
also be derived from the relationship of collective bargaining to organi-
zational decision making. Bargaining determines the terms of individual
employment by formal representation of individuals in organizational decision
making, usually under regulation by the state or federal government. Thus,
an individual's view of how decisions are currently made in his or her
academic setting might make bargaining seem more or less attractive.
Current decision-making practices can be viewed by individuals
from two perspectives, focusing either on their participation in decisions
or on the consequences of such decisions. Substantial research in organi-
zational psychology attempts to define and predict the effects of different
levels of personal participation in decision making, the former perspective,
on individual satisfaction and the quality of organizational decisions.
Differential personal participation in decision making, for reasons described
below, may also help explain an employee's desire to form a labor union.
Participation, however, only describes an individual's input to decision
making. The outcomes of decisions also affect individuals and provide a
second perspective on organizational decision making. The main purpose of
this research is to explore the usefulness of both views of organizational
decision making as explanations of interest in forming a faculty union.
First, individuals differ in their current levels of participation
in decision making and these differences may influence interest in a union.
Some academics can participate actively in the discussions leading to impor-
tant decisions, while others must rely on conversations with influential
colleagues or, in the extreme, remain completely isolated from these dis-
cussions. To begin with, the lower levels of participation in decision
making may provide little satisfaction for personal needs for control over
the work environment. Indeed, Strauss has argued that college professors
desire high participation more than the average worker. Also, low levels
of participation may violate professional expectations of faculty influence
in institutions of higher education. Allutto and Belasco, in a study of
primary and secondary school teachers, confirm that not meeting expectations
of participation in decisions predicts militant attitudes. By either
argument, then, low personal participation in decision making is expected
to be related to a greater desire for bargaining (Hypothesis 1).
Since organizational decisions vary in quality and produce
different consequences for each academic, a second aspect of organizational
decision making for individuals is the result or outcomes of decisions.
Depending on their view of such results individuals may view
decision making with either trust or suspicion. Gamson defines trust in
any decision-making situation as the expectation that the process will
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result in decisions favoring or acceptable to the individual's interests.
According to Gamson, level of trust determines the means of influence
adopted by different individuals and groups to change a decision-making
system. High trust suggests persuading the authorities; neutrality suggests
providing positive inducements to sway decision makers; low trust suggests
making use of sanctions and the threat of penalties. We assume that
collective bargaining implies to individual academics a rhetoric of demands
and the use of threat because of its association, in both private industry
and the public sector, with possible work stoppage. It is expected, there-
fore, that professors who have lower trust in current organization decision
making will desire bargaining more (Hypothesis 2). Kemerer and Baldridge,
for example, report that low trust in the administration predicts interest
in bargaining, but they do not isolate the importance of trust from other
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overlapping explanations of union interest.
The Studies
To explore these explanations of desire for faculty unionism, the
results of separate questionnaire surveys of academics in two upstate New York
institutions are used here. The questionnaires ask individuals the extent
of their individual desire for a faculty union and examine most explanations
of such an interest listed by Kemerer and Baldridge. The first survey, in
April 1974, covers all the full-time faculty at Cornell University. Cornell
is a large, research-oriented university including colleges under both pri-
vate and New York State control. Cornell is a complex, partly-public insti-
tution in a state with favorable legislation for public-employee unions.
Thus, despite its research orientation, Cornell has many of the characteris-
tics associated with union support. As of this writing, however, (in
September 1976) no union or professional association has attempted an
organizing drive.
The second survey covers the full-time faculty at Ithaca College
(IC) , a small, private college primarily offering undergraduate courses in
the liberal arts, Cornell and IC are located in the same upstate city,
Ithaca, NY. The survey, in May 1975, came shortly after a collective bar-
gaining representation election among the faculty supervised by the National
Labor Relations Board. The faculty at IC, with an 847,, turnout, rejected
collective bargaining: 627. voted for no representation, 247. for the American
Association of University Professors (A.A.U. P. ) and 157o for another faculty
association that had obtained a place on the ballot after a faculty petition
for an election on representation by the A.A.U. P.
The survey respondents at both institutions--567o (778) at Cornell
and 397o (109) at IC--are representative of the entire faculties in terms of
academic rank and sex. A significantly larger proportion of respondents
appears from the state-supported colleges at Cornell than from the private
colleges. The same pattern of results appears in both public and private
colleges, however.
Desire for unionism Is measured by six questions in both insti-
tutions; the wording is Identical except for the institution^ name. Each
Individual's score is the number of questions answered reflecting a positive
attitude towards unionism (Table 1). This dependent variable deserves atten-
tion for both cBBceptual and technical reasons.
First, the measure answers one criticism of the use of attitude
surveys on faculty unionism. These six questions range from support for
bargaining in general, e.g. is it "ever appropriate for college professors
to go on strike," to support for bargaining at the two specific institutions,
e.g. "would you vote for or against collective bargaining" at Cornell (or
Ithaca College)? (Table 1). Garbarino emphasizes the importance of identi-
fying interest in unionism at the individual's institution, in addition to
the more general legitimacy of strikes or collective bargaining for academics.
Table 1 shows the importance of this distinction. While 457o of our Cornell
repondents can envisage circumstances where strikes are appropriate, only
29% would vote for bargaining at Cornell. Moreover, in the Cornell study
these six items form a Guttman scale (Coefficient of scalability = .70).
The pattern of the Guttman scale is consistent with Garbarino's observation.
Individuals who favor bargaining at their own institution also endorse the
items on the general acceptability of bargaining. Rarely do individuals
endorse the specific items and reject the general principle. While the six
items do not produce so elegant a scale at IC, the same pattern of higher
acceptance of general statements also appears (Table 1).
The difference in wording among the six questions may well clarify
the paradox of attitude surveys cited by Garbarino, namely that bargaining
exists in only a minority of institutions of higher education while a majority
of individuals routinely endorse collective bargaining as a general principle.
While other surveys of single institutions have relied on questions about
the acceptability of collective bargaining as a general phenomenon, this
study asks about the desire for bargaining £t these specific institutions .
Second, these six questions provide a reasonable measure of desire
for unionism on psychometric grounds of internal consistency and validity.
Besides the Guttman characteristics at Cornell, the intercorrelations among
the items are high (r^.71), in addition to this evidence of consistency,
the six items also demonstrate concurrent validity in the Ithaca College
survey where respondents describe their vote in the N.L. R. B. election. The
individual's scores on the six-item scale used in both these studies is
strongly correlated (r = .76, p<1.001) with the reported act of voting for
either of the two potential bargaining agents in the IC election. At both
Cornell and Ithaca the scores of individuals on this measure of desire for
bargaining range from to 6; the average score at Ithaca (2.93) is signifi-
cantly greater than the average at Cornell (2.17) (t = 2.97, p<_.005).
The two aspects of the individual's views of organization decision
making hypothesized to affect desire for bargaining--personal participation
and trust--are also measured by indices composed of several questions.
First, the measure of personal participation includes several personnel and
financial decisions (e.g. hiring new faculty, promoting faculty, appointing
department heads, determining salary increases, and allocating the institu-
tional budget). For each decision, individuals select one of five descrip-
tions of their participation, ranging from no input, through prior consul-
tation with the decision maker, to a group decision by vote or consensus.
These descriptions are assigned values from 1 (no input) to 5 (group decision),
The personal participation in decision making scores for each individual is
the average value across a set of decisions. Scores on the nine decisions
in the Cornell questionnaire correlate weakly among themselves and the
median intercorrelation is low (r = .16, p<..001). The Ithaca College
questionnaire only Includes six of these questions which were more strongly
associated with an interest in bargaining. Their median intercorrelation
is somewhat stronger (r = .37, p^^.OOl). Thus, in both institutions, personal
participation varies between decisions. No single decision, however, is very
strongly associated with desire for bargaining; the strongest correlation
is .17 at Cornell (p = .001) and r = .27 (p = .01) at Ithaca College.
Although the relationship is only moderate, the decision where low personal
participation is most strongly related to a desire for bargaining is the
same at both institutions, namely allocation of the institutional budget.
In order to test the hypothesized overall effect of personal participation
at both institutions, the decisions are combined into a single measure rather
than analyzed separately.
Trust in the decision-making process is the next hypothesized
predictor. It is measured by summing Likert-type questions on how frequently
the individual academic can trust both the decision maker and decision pro-
cedures at each of three hierarchical levels to make decisions the individual
considers appropriate. The hierarchical levels are department, college and
university at Cornell and department, school, and college at IC. As with
the participation measure, however, the number of questions is reduced between
the Cornell and Ithaca College surveys. Because of the high correlation
between trust in the decision maker and trust in decision procedures for any
hierarchical level, the three questions referring to decision procedures
appear only in the Cornell index. The median correlation among the trust
items is higher than for the participation questions at both Cornell (r = .46,
p ^.001) and Ithaca College (r = .41, p^L.OOl). Lower trust in all three
levels--department to university— is associated about equally with desire
for bargaining at Cornell; the correlations range from .28 to .34. At
Ithaca College, lower trust in the President of the institution has the
strongest correlation (r = .38, p^.OOl), while lower trust in the depart-
ment head is the weakest (r = .14, p = .09). In order to test the second
hypothesis, these questions are summed into a single measure of trust in
organizational decision making.
The questionnaires also include other explanations of desire for
bargaining corresponding to the three categories of explanations from pre-
vious research: objective organizational position, personal characteristics,
and subjective attitudes about the organization. First, as regards to
position in the organization, the organizational status of each academic is
measured at Cornell by an index built by assigning numerical values to
salary level, any administrative position and academic rank.
Administrative positions include department heads up to associate deans at
Cornell, but only department heads at Ithaca College because the NLRB's
bargaining unit defines the sample at IC. These values are standardized to
give each question equal weight and then summed. An index is used because
salary level and rank are strongly correlated. At Ithaca College the same
measure of organizational status is used, but organizational status is
necessarily a less powerful explanation of support for bargaining at IC than
at Cornell because academics at higher ranks show more support for bargaining
at Ithaca College. Although the index of organizational status at IC com-
bines measures with different relationships with the dependent variable,
separate analyses of the two measures (salary and rank) does not change the
results and the index is retained for ease of comparability with the Cornell
results. Besides organizational status, an individual's academic discipline
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in the humanities or social sciences as opposed to biological or physical
sciences is also included as a position-related explanation of desire for
bargaining.
Next, two characteristics of the academic's personal background
are included as potential explanations of desire for unionism. Political
liberalism is measured by identifying the individuals' preference in the
1976 Presidential election. Each of thirteen viable candidates as of 1974
and 1975 are assigned a numerical value from conservative to liberal based
on the average ranking these candidates received in subsequent interviews
with a randomly selected sample of the Cornell faculty. Those interviewees
show moderate agreement on their rankings (Kendall's coefficient of concor-
dance = .46, p^.Ol). This relatively low interrater reliability suggests that tl
findings with respect to liberalism in this study should be interpreted with
caution. In addition, the survey respondents also indicate their sex and
age on the questionnaire. Because of its high correlation with rank and
salary, age is not included in the data analysis, leaving sex and liberalism
as personal factors.
Finally, each individual's organizational attitudes are also assessed
in one critical area, dissatisfaction with current salary level.
Results
An academic's view of organizational decision making, as hypothe-
sized, does help explain why some would want a union in an institution of
higher education. Table 2 presents the correlations between desire for
faculty bargaining and two aspects of organizational decision making from
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the individual's perspective--personal participation and trust. Only at
Cornell are lower levels of personal participation in decisions also
associated with a greater desire for unionism (Hypothesis 1). At both
institutions, individuals who distrust the existing process of organizational
decision making more, show significantly higher levels of interest in union-
ism than their more trusting colleagues (Hypothesis 2). At both institutions
moreover, distrust is significantly more strongly associated with such desire
than are low levels of personal participation (At Cornell p^.OOl, at IC
The relative importance of distrust in organizational decision
making rather than low personal participation as an explanation of union
interest also appears in Table 3. There, all the potential explanations of
support for bargaining are included in a multiple regression analysis to
determine the separate validity of each explanation--organizational status,
academic discipline, sex, liberalism, and economic dissatisfaction. Distrust
is a valid predictor of desire for bargaining at both institutions, even when
the effects of all other explanations are statistically controlled. In con-
trast, the absence of a significant regression coefficient for personal
participation in Table 3 shows that personal participation in decision
making adds nothing to the other explanations of interest in bargaining.
Therefore, while the first hypothesis on the effects of personal participa-
tion on interest in unionism is not supported, the second hypothesis on the
role of trust is strongly supported.
Table 3 also provides the information from both surveys required
to assess the validity of various other explanations of individual interest
in unionism developed in previous research. At Cornell, salary dissatisfaction
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and distrust in organizational decision making emerge as the best predictors
in the multiple regression analysis. Besides their validity as the strongest
explanations indicated by the significance levels in Table 3, these two
explanations also show the strongest; simple correlation with desire for
bargaining (Table 2). Political liberalism appears next in terms of signi-
ficance as an explanation. Finally, a discipline of humanities or social
sciences also adds significantly to the explanation of interest in unionism
among the faculty. At Ithaca College, distrust and salary dissatisfaction
are again most strongly correlated with a desire for bargaining (Table 2).
In the more stringent multiple regression analysis (Table 3), however, of
these two attitudinal explanations only distrust adds significantly to the
prediction of desire for unionism. In addition, the academic disciplines
of the humanities and social sciences also emerge as a valid explanation at
Ithaca College although not at Cornell.
In summary, these results show some support for each of the three
categories of explanations advanced in the earlier review of the literature.
Organizational status and academic discipline, both aspects of the individual's
position within the organization help explain a desire for unionism. Poli-
tical liberalism, probably a reflection of the individual's personal back-
ground outside the institution, is independently associated with interest
in unionism only at Cornell. Finally and most importantly, individual atti-
tudes towards the organization also emerge in these studies as the strongest
explanations of a desire for unionism. Salary dissatisfaction and distrust
in decision making are most useful at Cornell and distrust again emerges at
Ithaca College. Of the two aspects of the individual's view of the decision-
making process only this attitude of distrust and not low levels of perceived
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personal participation predict a desire for a faculty union.
From a psychological perspective, subjective individual attitudes
Cowards the organization, such as salary dissatisfaction and distrust,
result from a combination of objective organizational position and
personal characteristics. For example, salary dissatisfaction reflects
both current and desired salary levels. Similarly, distrust in decision
making reflects not any particular policies or decision practices, but the
individual's personal assessment of the decision-making process.
The subjective process of assessment by individuals suggests that
differences in organizational position or personal background may influence
the desire for unionism either directly or indirectly through organizational
attitudes. At Cornell, low organizational status and political liberalism
predict a desire for unionism directly beyond the influence of organizational
attitudes. In a set of multiple regression equations not reported in detail
here, organizational attitudes were regressed on organizational position
and personal background to identify indirect effects. Low organizational
status and an academic discipline in the humanities on social sciences
have such indirect effects. Status differences significantly predict the
organizational attitudes of salary dissatisfaction; differences in both status
and academic discipline predict distrust in decision making with low status
and an academic discipline in the humanities or social sciences associated
with distrust. These attitudinal differences in turn are related to a desire
for a union. At Ithaca College, there are ro indirect effects; academic
discipline and distrust in decision making predict an interest in unionism
directly.
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Discussion
These studies highlight the importance of an individual's view of
the current process of organizational decision making as a reason for some
academics to favor the introduction of faculty unionism in an institution
of higher education. Collective bargaining constitutes one system of indi-
vidual participation in organizational decision making, namely representation
or indirect participation. Those people who experience little direct personal
participation in current decision making were hypothesized to desire collective
bargaining in order to change the existing decision system. However, only
distrust in the current decision-making system, rather than low levels of
personal participation, emerges as a useful predictor of support for bar-
gaining. People with more trust in the existing decision process favor bar-
gaining less regardless of their personal participation in decisions. This
finding substantiates and clarifies the high correlation between trust in
the administration and opposition to bargaining reported in their national
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sample by Kemerer and Baldridge. By the multivariate analysis described
in Table 3, distrust can be isolated as an explanation for a desire for
bargaining even when level of participation in decision making and a range
of position-related and personal explanations are controlled statistically.
Since low personal participation has little direct influence on
bargaining attitudes, administrative attempts to defuse faculty support for
unionism by opening decision processes to individual participation may have
little value. In theory, trust refers specifically to anticipated satisfaction
with the results of organizational decision making rather than to involvement
13
in the decision process. Until institutions change objectionable policies
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to favor (or at least become acceptable to) the individual interests of
various academics, the desire for a union by some faculty members will
endure. It should be noted, however, that while personal participation has
little importance across the entire faculty, at least for the decisions
examined here, past research on its other effects suggests that some indi-
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viduals may respond more favorably to increased participation.
The desire for unions at these two institutions also reflects the
drive for economic self- improvement as an explanation of unionism. Because
academics are often alleged to attach more value to noneconomic rewards from
their work (such as freedom or a sense of accomplishment) compared to most
other workers, these studies provide a stringent test of the economic
explanation for employees' turning to unionism.
The two institutions in the present study, while not necessarily
representative of all higher education, sound a warning both for private,
four-year colleges like Ithaca College and for wealthy, research institu-
tions like Cornell. Ladd and Lipset's early study might suggest that faculty
members will resist bargaining indefinitely in some high-status sectors of
higher education. Based on the present studies, desire for bargaining
may represent a selective interest in organizational change focused on
economic issues and reflecting distrust in the administration. In a con-
tinuing financial squeeze, a growing number of the individuals in any insti-
tution may turn to collective bargaining simply to improve their economic
positions. In this respect, a study of individual attitudes leads us to
expect a wider spread to faculty unionism.
The range of potential explanations for individuals turning to
unionism in these institutions suggest a general two-stage causal process
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to explain individual interest in unionism. In the first place, certain
organizational positions or personal characteristics condition employees to
favor unionism. In a second stage, beyond the direct effects of organizational
position or personal background, these factors may act indirectly on desire
for bargaining through their effect on mediating organizational attitudes
such as dissatisfaction with salary or distrust in the administration. At
Cornell, for example, low organizational status has both a direct association
with the desire for a union and an indirect influence through its effect on
both distrust in decision making and dissatisfaction with salary.
The different patterns of prediction of these two institutions
suggest the idiosyncratic nature of support for unionism. For example,
higher ranking faculty favored bargaining at Ithaca College; as opposed to
lower ranking faculty at Cornell. While dissatisfaction with salary and
distrust in the administration as organizational attitudes hold some promise
as generalized explanations of an interest in bargaining, the particular
structure and history of an institution will determine what groups within
the faculty hold those subjective predispositions.
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TABLE 2
Simple Correlations Among Predictors of Desire for Bargaining:
Cornell University (N >^ 653) and, in parentheses,
Ithaca College (N >_ 92)
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
Desire for
Bargaining
2.
TABLE 3
Multiple Regression Coefficients for Predicton of Desire for Bargaining
a b
Cornell (N=610) Ithaca College (N=89)
1. Organizational status (low) .07 *
.04
* itit
2. Academic discipline .07 .29
(humanities or social
sciences)
3. Sex (female) .00 .09
4. Political liberalism .13 -.02
5. Personal participation .04 -.07
in decision making (low)
6. Trust in decision making .25 .26
(low)
itii
7. Dissatisfaction with salary .28 .20
* Indicates significance at p < .05.
** Indicates significance at p < .001.
a. The multiple correlation at Cornell is .53 (p^.OOl).
b. The multiple correlation at Ithaca College is .51 (p^.OOl).
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